The Best War Ever: Lies, Damned Lies, and the Mess in Iraq Review

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The Best War Ever: Lies, Damned Lies, and the Mess in Iraq ReviewAs the promise of a quick victory in Iraq fades on the horizon, and the reality of a long, messy and costly occupation emerges, authors Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber's timely book "The Best War Ever: Lies Damned Lies, and the Mess in Iraq" examines the details behind the propaganda and the headlines that led to the war in Iraq. The authors' main point is that the wave of propaganda and lies continues, and while this is a multi million business that successfully 'sold' the war to Americans, the campaign isn't reality. Those who created the war, coveted the war, profit from it, and sold it are immersed in an incredible, dangerous fantasy of 'victory' 'liberty' and the spread of 'democracy.' Meanwhile those who chose to read this book are likely to be those who haven't drunk the cool-aid and are probably already opposed to the war for a variety of reasons. While I'd like to imagine that the book would help change the pro-war opinion, it probably won't happen. Nonetheless, the facts presented here will stun and sicken those already opposed to the war, and by the time the last page is turned, the anti-Iraq war reader will feel their opinions solidified.
The book details the PR campaign ($300 million over a 5 year period) launched before the war. It takes a particularly cynical mind to conduct surveys with a focus on "casualty aversion" in order to analyze how a war can be 'sold' to the people, but those surveys were conducted with the conclusion that Americans would swallow the Iraq war without too much squawking if they believed the war would "ultimately succeed." Experts on the pre-war Future of Iraq Project urged the administration to consider back up plans in case it didn't go smoothly and even predicted looting and the emergence of insurgency. This team was replaced, and the invasion of Iraq sailed ahead with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz predicting that Iraq could "finance its own reconstruction." Fat chance of that happening. By late 2003, the occupation was costing America 1 billion a week, and by the end of 2005, 5.9 billion a month!
The book also examines specific linguistic choices made by the speechmakers and the media spokespeople in order to present a united, positive front on the subject of Iraq, and hand-in-hand with the word choices is the "bloodless" approach to the war--the suppression of photos, the lack of coverage of the horrendous wounds some of our soldiers are coming home with--plus the lack of coverage of the deaths of Iraqis.
There's a lot of 'old' material here--the Valerie Plame outing, the smear campaign against Wilson, the forged documents detailing the purchase of uranium oxide, etc. But in spite of the fact some of this is old news, the authors plug the material into the book to illustrate an overall pattern of the media burying stories and retractions while hyping rumours of supposed weapons findings in Iraq. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) for example, with their "big impact" project and a generous budget of 300 million hunted for WMD in Iraq but couldn't discover anything. But no matter--because the lack of weapons led to a U.S. intelligence theory that Saddam deliberately acted suspicious to 'dupe' America. The twists and turns of the propaganda used for this war would be hilarious if it were fictional--but it's not--it's real--and people are dying because of it.
One of the best sections of the book covers the arguments that led to the war, and includes quotes from those who predicted invading Iraq would be a piece of cake ("I really do believe we will be greeted as liberators"- Cheney). New arguments have been created for remaining in Iraq, and once again by putting this all in print, the authors illustrate an insidious pattern of shifting propaganda. The authors successfully debunk all the arguments for the war--including the flypaper theory, and instead argue that it's time for damage control. The book includes scrupulous footnotes and an index--displacedhumanThe Best War Ever: Lies, Damned Lies, and the Mess in Iraq Overview

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The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict Review

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The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict ReviewThree trillion dollars for the war in Iraq is an incredible amount, almost beyond comprehension, and certainly far beyond the figures provided by the Bush administration. Yet this total is made both credible and comprehensible through the documentation of Joseph Stiglitz (2001 Nobel Prize-winner in economics, and Professor at Columbia) and Linda Bilmes, Harvard University expert on public policy and finance.
Compelling alternative uses for the money are numerous. For example, we could have put Social Security on sound financial footing for a fraction of that cost, and avoided the nearly 4,000 American deaths (plus $500,000/death benefits) and 100,000 estimated Iraqi deaths - plus an untold number of seriously wounded and their long-term disability and health costs. (Stiglitz found that 40% of Gulf War troops were declared disabled, and that was only a one month war; he sees Pentagon estimates of Gulf War II wounded and disabled as grossly understated, and documents that conclusion. Another key point - peak disability expenditures for WWII veterans did not occur until 1993; thus this war will affect spending decades into the future.) Alternatively, America's trillion dollar+ infrastructure needs could be met with only half that expense.
Other costs include skyrocketing re-enlistment bonuses (up to $150,000 - their alternative is personal safety or much higher-paid private security work), the extra costs of using reserve and guard troops, up to $1,222/day for private security guards to replace servicemen paid less than one-sixth that, lost billions to reconstruct Iraq and spent in non-competitive bidding, and massive equipment replacement costs.
Then there are the opportunity costs associated with spending the money overseas, with no return to the American economy, increased pressure on the dollar, and the likely increased cost of oil. Finally, what about the interest costs of financing this war with debt, and our increased reliance on foreign nations holding that debt?
Supposedly this war is being fought to promote democracy. Yet, as Stiglitz points out, it is being mostly sold and funded through hiding the costs from the public. Continuing our presence in Iraq may, with interest, raise the total to $6-7 trillion. Meanwhile, bin Laden roams free, and even more Islamicists hate us.
"The Three Trillion Dollar War" is MUST reading.The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict Overview

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Blood On Our Hands: the American Invasion and Destruction of Iraq Review

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Blood On Our Hands: the American Invasion and Destruction of Iraq ReviewI had the opportunity to hear Mr. Davies speak about his book in Miami, Florida. This book is a brillant document with the specific details to show that the war in Iraq is an illegal war. Reading it can be shocking as the documentation Mr. Davies provides is graphic and to the point. This book should be in every library and classroom and a copy sent to every member of Congress.Blood On Our Hands: the American Invasion and Destruction of Iraq Overview

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The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al-Qaeda Review

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The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al-Qaeda ReviewNearly a decade after 9/11 we're still fighting in Afghanistan, and have yet to withdraw from Iraq (hopefully this year). While we haven't had another major terrorist attack since, we have spent over $1 trillion, thousands have died, and evidence indicates that we've also inspired a surge in Islamist opposition. Currently, many reports indicate things are not going well in Afghanistan. Peter Bergen's (one of the very few Westerners to interview Osama Bin Laden) summary in "The Longest War" is interesting and credible, though suffers from a obvious errors and only superficial treatment of Afghanistan.

The first error occurs at the very beginning when Bergen asserts that 9/11 represented a miscalculation by Bin Laden, causing the collapse of the Taliban regime and the destruction of Al-Qaeda's safe have in Afghanistan. However, given the Taliban's subsequent resurgence, Al-Qaeda's successful relocation to Pakistan etc., and its continued ability to roil and financially bleed foes around the world with various bombings and even attempted bombings, Bin Laden is undoubtedly quite pleased with the trade-off.

Bergen continues with important background - how Bin Laden had concluded that the U.S. was weak, based on our pullout from Vietnam in the 1970s, Reagan's fleeing Beirut after the Marine barracks bombing, Clinton's withdrawal of forces in Somalia after the 'Black Hawk Down' incident a decade later, and our failure to respond to the U.S.S. Cole bombing just prior to Bush II becoming president. As for Al-Qaeda's contribution to the Soviet departure from Afghanistan, Bergen believes it is much overrated - the number of Afghans fighting totaled about 175,000, vs. no more than several hundred outside Arabs at any one time.

After the spectacular successes or our initial Afghanistan bombing campaign, major U.S. blunders eventually undid most of those successes. The biggest was General Franks' refusal to provide more troops at Tora Bora when Bin Laden was fleeing the country, and the Pentagon's ignoring a Special Forces request to be dropped on Pakistan's side of Tora Bora to trap Bin Laden from behind. Instead, Bergen points out, the U.S. relied on 2,000 Afghans under commanders that disliked each other more than Al-Qaeda, and also happy to take bribes from Arabs trying to escape the U.S. bombing assault.

Per Bergen, U.S. commanders at the time were overly concerned over potential casualties and offending Afghan warlords. Some also excused our inaction by claiming insufficient evidence that Bin Laden was at Tora Bora; however, Bergen also reports that V.P. Cheney stated at the time that "Bin Laden was probably there." Pakistan's military, meanwhile, was distracted at the time by a mobilization on its border with India in response to an earlier Pakistani terrorist attack on India's Parliament.

The Bush administration was terrified of another terrorist attack, and thus authorized outsourcing torture to other nations, and pushed terrorist trials by military commissions where it is not required that defendants see all evidence, and coerced testimony and hearsay evidence are admissible. Bergen, however, also goes to some length to establish that the U.S. gained more useful information via humane treatment than otherwise. Most, if not all, information touted as gained from more aggressive techniques turned out to be false alarms or dated information.
The 'War of Error' (Iraq) was meant to prevent a next attack. However, again, early military successes were nearly undone by subsequent mistakes - specifically Bremer's orders removing Baath party officials from all positions and dissolving Iraq's military, the U.S. military's refusal to negotiate with Sunni leaders until years later, failure to even attempt to secure Iraqi weapons caches estimated to total 1 million tons, humiliating home searches that widely antagonized the populace, and the Abu Ghraib scandal. As for preventing a supposed link-up between Hussein's Iraq and Al-Qaeda, Bergen reports that in 2006 the CIA estimated there were only 1,300 foreign fighters in Iraq - albeit almost all Al-Qaeda and the source of most of the suicide attackers. IEDs were the leading cause of American combat deaths by the latter half of 2005 - yet only about 10% of military transport trucks were armored, and the military delayed procurement of more - another major mistake.

Returning to Afghanistan, Bush II blocked nation-building there, we deployed only 6,000 soldiers initially, and blocked the use of non-U.S. troops outside Kabul for the first two years. Bergen believes that Pakistan's haven was the key to the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan. Between 2001-06, no senior Taliban leader was arrested or killed in Pakistan, despite the fact that most of them lived there. Heroin growth provided much better income to Afghan farmers than other crops, and even many urban occupations - about $12/day, per Bergen, a month's pay for most. Since about 10% of the population grew poppies, this put the U.S. in a quandary - alienate Afghans, or allow the drug to fuel social problems at home. By the time President Bush II left office, the Taliban had a presence in 72% of Afghanistan.

The 2005 London subway bombings cost about $14,000, including airfares to/from Pakistan and chemicals, and Bergen reports Bin Laden bragged in 2004 that Al-Qaeda's $500,000 'investment' in 9/11 created a $500 billion loss for the U.S. (Undoubtedly an underestimate, given our subsequent expenditures in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for Homeland Security.) Here Bergen commits his second major error - claiming that Al-Qaeda naively believed they could bleed the West dry. Between China and the War on Terror, our finances are obviously suffering.

Many fear Internet-spawned terrorism acts. Bergen, however, claims no evidence of a successful terrorist attacked operationalized mainly via the Internet. Further, while the 2003 Madrid train bombings were the product of a 'leaderless jihad' financed via local drug dealings, the most effective terrorists were usually organized training camp graduates. As for 'the bomb' - Bergen sees little likelihood Al-Qaeda will succeed because Pakistan's weapons (the most likely source) utilize electronic locks and probably are stored disassembled, and the total amount of stolen highly enriched uranium is only one-third that required to create a bomb. (Also, making a bomb requires considerable skill and precision.)

Positive U.S. moves include General Petreus' requiring troops to live among Iraqi citizens ("we can't commute to this war"), negotiating (belatedly) with local tribal leaders, creating the equivalent of gated communities, 'the surge,' increased use of drones, chain analysis of captured cell phones, and targeting IED makers. Bergen lists Malaki's initiating operations against former ally Al-Sadr and Shia forces in Basra and ending the Shia bias within its military and police forces as positive Iraqi moves.

What did we accomplish in Iraq? None of the stated goals, says Bergen. No WMDs were found or in production, no alliance between Saddam and Al-Qaeda was found, no democratic domino effect occurred in the region, peace did not come to Israel, and the war was not paid for via increased oil revenues to Iraq.

The 'good news,' per Bergen, is that Al-Qaeda is creating growing problems for itself via Muslim civilian deaths, failing to provide either a positive vision of where it is going or social services such as schools and welfare assistance, and alienating one government after another - including Iran. Surveys, however, show a positive view of the Taliban in Afghanistan; moreover, there are those discouraging reports from non-military personnel on the scene. I fear Bergen is over-optimistic.The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al-Qaeda Overview

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